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Abstract. As secure storage becomes more pervasive throughout the enterprise, 
the focus quickly moves from implementing encrypting storage devices to 
establishing effective and secure key management policies. Without the proper 
key generation, distribution, storage, and recovery, valuable data will be 
eventually compromised [9]. Although a considerable amount of research has 
been dedicated to encryption algorithms in the past decades, key management 
becomes an issue due to the quantity of data. For example, with millions of data 
you will need million set of keys. To manage and keep track of these keys, 
complexity and operational inefficiency becomes an issue. How to manage keys 
becomes a challenging task. Adequate understanding of these new challenges is 
essential to effectively devise new key management policies and mechanisms to 
guard against them. We discuss many of these methods in this new context to 
fill this gap.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent advance in data storage technology has seen the capacity of data increased beyond 
the Petabytes range [6, 5]. Nowadays, data may come from different variety of sources such as 
semi-structured or unstructured data. These data may contain confidential records ranging from 
social security numbers, credit card information to patients medical imaging and personal 
financial data. In order to store these data, mass storage spaces are required. Thus, confidential 
data stored on the mass storage devices is at risk to be disclosed to persons getting physical 
access to the device. To protect and secure these data, encryption methods are introduced and 
used. Encryption contains two fundamental components: the encryption algorithm and the key. 
There are standard implementations for encryption algorithms such as DES, 3DES, AES and 
P1619 AES-XTS [10] for encrypt data-at-rest
1 
and IPSec [11], Fibre Channel Secure Protocol 
(FCSP) to transport encrypted data-in-flight. Although these encryption algorithms are not new 
in the cryptography research, however, it provides a mean of reducing the risk to minimum.  
 
Whenever we perform encryption, a key is generated or allocated by the key generator based 
on the specific security policies for either to encrypt or decrypt the data. To ensure that security 
is maintained for encryption operations, processes must be put into place that allow for 
complete control and security of the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the data. Thus, in 
storage, the focus quickly moves from implementing encrypting storage devices to establishing 
effective key management policies, as secure storage becomes more pervasive throughout the 
enterprise. Without the proper generation, distribution, storage, and recovery of keys, valuable 
data will be eventually compromised. Worse, without proper management of keys, data can be 
completely lost [8] on the disk.  
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To safeguard the keys, appliances based encryptions are widely adopted. For example, 
NeoScale System [17, 19, 14, 18, 16, 15] Key Vault has introduced a centralized policy-based 
management for tape media and NetApps Decru [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] has come up with Life 
Time Key Manager (LTKM). One of the benefits of using these appliances is that the gen-
erated keys never exposed or available to the users or to the hosts. When exporting keys out 
from the appliance for backup or recovery purposes, the keys are further encrypted with a 
master key. The master key is a quorum m of n also known as Shamir’s secret sharing scheme 
[13, 29], since m ≤ n of the original n shares are needed to reconstruct the master key, where m 
is chosen when the master key generation is performed. Thus, extra security measures ensuring 
the administrator cannot recover encrypted keys by only him/herself. However, one of the 
disadvantages is still a performance bottleneck limited by its bandwidth as all data must travel 
through to the appliances for encryption and decryption.  
 
Only until recently, there are a number of new methods proposed from industry vendors for 
example, by performing encryption at Fabric Switch[??] and Hard disk drive known as Full 
Disk Encryption (FDE)[26, 27, 28, 3]. Each method has its own merits and weaknesses.  
 
While performing encryption at the appliance level and Fibre Channel Switch level, key 
lifecycle must be well maintained and policies must be enforced. Key lifecycle consists the 
following:  
  key generation  
  key distribution  
  key recovery  
  key backup  
  key storage  
  key revocation/deletion and  
  re-key  
 
We organize the paper as follows: In section 2, we discuss work on the encryption in SAN and 
a brief discussion on the encryption keys. In section 3, we discuss work on the key 
management in SAN. Emphasis will be placed on key management as keys are crucial in 
providing access control, authentication for the users to access the data. In Section 4, we 
discuss possible research direction and finally, we conclude in Section 5.  
 
2. Encryption in Storage Area Network 
 
In Data Storage, Data-at-Rest encryption can be applied anywhere in the data center. For 
example, the encryption can be performed at Host, Fibre Channel Switch, Appliance, Disk 
Array Controller, and Hard Disk Drive (HDD) such as Real Time Disk Encryption (RTDE) or 
the Full Disk Encryption drive (FDE).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Data-at-rest encryption in data center 
 The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
Fascicle I – 2009. Economics and Applied Informatics. Years XV - ISSN 1584-0409 
 
 
  95
Figure 1 shows a typical SAN where data-at-rest encryption can be applied. The following lists 
the advantages and disadvantages of each approach for data-at-rest in the data center: 
Host : At host, perform encryption [1] to data before en-route to the disk arrays. This seems to 
be the benefit factor because the data is encrypted before it leaves the host. Thus, the channel 
between the host to the disk arrays can be fairly safe. However, there are some downsides of 
this approach:  
  It will depend on the operating system at host. For example, some cards can only run on 
Windows 2000/2003 or limited Linux build kernels. Because encryption cards reside on 
host, so, the operating system support is a limited factor.  
  Data tape cartridges are normally shipped with compression capabilities or data de-
duplication can save storage space in the storage arrays. If the data arrives to tape in an 
encrypted format, or encryption is performed before de-duplication, then the compression 
capabilities or the de-duplication will simply not work.  
  Single point of failure. Host can be attacked or compromised. If this happens, then data 
could not be retrieved.  
  Potential bottleneck. The host may connect to many pcs and many users may 
simultaneously access data through to the same host at the same time. Thus, heavy loads 
could result in bottleneck.  
  For example, the nCipher nShield is an encryption product that sits in the host.  
 
Fibre channel Switch : In the fabric, encryption is applied and then en-route to the disk arrays. 
The main advantage is that the cost savings over the appliance based encryption. Thus, 
eliminating the need to have extra appliances performing the encryption. The disadvantages 
are: 
  Limit to bandwidth of the fabric. Thus, if the fabric can only support 4Gbps then the 
encryption engine can handle 4Gbps traffic at any time.  
  Product proprietary to vendors. Eg. Tied to vendors for specific fabric switch.  
  Data path between host and fabric switch are not protected. Thus, open up possible data 
attack between host and fabric switch.  
 
Some fabric switch vendors for example are the Cisco MDS9000 series and Nexus 7000 Series 
Brocade Silk-Worm series and CipherMax CM180D, CM250 and CM500.  
 
Appliance: Encryption and Decryption are embedded inside the hardware specifically design to 
intercept plain data traffic from fabric switch and re-route it to the disk arrays. The advantages 
include operating system independent regardless from the host and load balancing distribution 
function for multiple appliances management. Thus, allow more data traffics from multiple 
fabrics. However, the disadvantages include the purchase the multiple appliances could be 
costly and data path between host to fabric switch and into the appliance are not protected. 
Thus, open up possible of data attacks. Some appliance vendors include, NetApp’s Decru 
DataFort and Ncipher’s Neoscale FCDisk. Disk Controller: The encryption and decryption 
hardware reside on the disk controller [25] itself. The main advantage of this is that xxx. The 
disadvantages include product proprietary to vendors. Some Disk Controller vendors for 
example the Fujitsu Eternus series  
  Real Disk Encryption: This is a hardware based encryption chip board that sits between the 
disk controller and the Hard Disk Drive. The vendor that supplies this product is the X-
Wall MX series from nNova Technology.  
  Full Disk Encryption: With the introduction of Full Disk Encryption (FDE) drive level, the 
FDE drive security provides a range of superior benefits for protecting an enterprise 
systems data-at-rest when compared to current software and hardware encryption tools. 
Such as the performance of the encryption is not affected by the FDE drive since the 
encryption engine is in the disk drives and matches the drives maximum port speed, thus The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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encryption won’t slow a system down. In terms of scalability, its performance 
automatically scales every time storage is added in the data center. Some of the vendors 
that carry FDE include Seagate, Hitachi and Fujitsu Disk Drives. 
  
2.1. Symmetric Key Algorithms 
 
Symmetric-key algorithms are a class of cryptography algorithms uses a simple single or one 
cryptography key for both encryption and decryption. The key lengths vary accordingly and it 
depends on the cryptography algorithms used. Some of the earlier algorithms such as the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) proposed under the Federal Information Processing 
Standards(FIPS) in the US in 1976 had a block cipher with 64 blocks and a key length of 56 
bits. Due to the key size limitation of this algorithm, DES is consider to be insecure for many 
applications and was broken in 22 hours by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.  
 
2.1.1. 3DES  
Since the vulnerability of DES algorithm due to small key size of 2
55 
is not enough to protect 
the brute force attacks, therefore 3DES has been introduced to extend the key space to 168 bits 
(3×56 bits) without changing to another algorithm. The algorithm operates as follow:  
DES(k3 ;DES(k2 ;DES(k1 ;M))) 
 
where M is the plain block to be encrypted and k3 ,k2 ,k1 are DES keys. Although the DES 
has increased its key size to 168bits,thebestknow attack(meet-in-the-middle)requires 232 
known pairs of plain text and cipher text, 2
88 
units of storage space, 2
113 
steps, 2
90 
single DES 
encryption[12], this is not currently practical and suffers from slow performance in software.  
 
2.1.2. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)  
 
AES algorithm is a replacement of the DES algorithm in 2001 by the NIST [4] after a 5 year 
standardization process. AES standard key length can be either 128, 192 and 256, however, it 
is possible to go beyond 256 bit key length. In storage security, AES 128 bit has been 
commonly used while the AES 256 bit becomes a norm in today’s industry standards. AES is a 
series of linked mathematical operations using block cipher known as the substitution-
permutation network and it is fast both in software and hardware implementation compared to 
DES.  
 
2.1.3. Variation of AES  
 
Since the introduction of AES algorithm which is a block of fixed length, eg. 128 bits, several 
modes of operation have been proposed which allow block cipher to vary the messages of 
arbitrary length. The earlier modes such as the Electronic Code Book (ECB), Cipher-Block 
Chaining (CBC), Output Feed Back (OFB) and Cipher Feed Back(CFB)provide only either the 
message integrity or the confidentiality. Other modes now include the message integrity and 
the confidentiality such as the Integrity protection and Error Propagation (IPEP), Counter with 
CBC-MAC(CCM), EAX, Galois Counter Mode(GCM), Offset Codebook Mode(OCB).  
 
Only until recently, we have seen the modes of operation for tweakable narrow-block 
encryption eg. LRWand wide-block encryption (CMC and EME) modes, designed for the disk 
encryption. The IEEE 1619.1[10] is an example of XEX-TCB-XTS (XTS) for Cryptographic 
Protection of Data on Block-Oriented Storage Devices. Other variation such as the 
IEEE1619.1 (Authenticated Encryption) andIEEE1619.2 (Wide-Block Encryption)are also 
proposed and used in disk encryption.  
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2.2. Asymmetric Key 
 
Asymmetric key is used mainly for exchange, transport or wrapping symmetric keys since 
asymmetric public key algorithms are relatively computationally costly in comparison with 
many symmetric algorithms such as AES. Thus, in storage security, we tend to use both 
cryptosystems for reasons of efficiency . In such a cryptosystem, symmetric keys are used to 
encrypt and decrypt data while in asymmetric keys, we have pair of (public and private) key. 
Public key is used to encrypt symmetric key while the private key is used to decrypt encrypted 
symmetric key. This often applies to key backup, key archiving or key restore or retrieval 
situations.  
 
3. Key Management in Storage Area Network 
 
Current Research works have been focused on key management architectures. Key 
management is classified into three groups:  
  Centralized key management 
  Distributed key management  
  Hybrid key management 
 
In centralized key management system, all key creation, re-key, modification, deletion, 
backup, logs & events are performed centrally. The administrator has centralized control over 
where each part of the key management process occurs and limits the points at which the keys 
and data can be accessed by users or devices that perform encryption.   
 
The advantage of this approach is that the control over key management is easier. However, 
there are a number of disadvantages. Firstly, to secure the key exchange between users and 
centralized key manager, there are a number of methods and techniques proposed in the 
literature such as SSH [30], TLS [2], IPSec [11]. These methods suffer from an increase in the 
latency because extra algorithm must be applied to secure the communication channel. 
Secondly, if the centralized site is compromised by attackers, then the entire system will fail. A 
backup site for the centralized manager will thus be necessary. This increase the complexity of 
the system by introducing a backup recovery plan, which add cost to the system design. 
Substantial time will be required to recover from the backup in cases of failure. Lastly, the key 
recovery process may be slower in a centralized system because more time is required to re-
establish the keys at remote site.  
 
NeoScale System [17,19,14,18] is based on a centralized policy management. It implements 
block-level encryption and authentication and forwards the encrypted payload to the secondary 
storage subsystem. In their approach, the payload must go through the CryptoStor
2 
for 
encryption. During the process, keys are generated either by users manually or by the random 
number generator. The keys are stored in CryptoStor KeyVault and never leave the appliance. 
KeyVault is usually deployed between bridge, router and switch. This approach suffers from 
two drawbacks. Firstly, all data must go through the CryptoStor for encryption. This will create 
a performance bottleneck. Secondly, the data are plain unsecured text before it reaches to the 
CryptoStor. As a result, data can be compromised prior to reaching the appliance. Similar 
appliance is reported for the NetApp Decru DataFort.  
 
In distributed key management, users manage their own keys locally. This makes key recovery 
relatively easier compared to a centralized system. Distributed systems provide better security 
mechanisms in place such that if one site is compromised or down, the rest of the site are still 
operational. However, there is no key management policy between a central site and remote 
sites since each site generates its keys independently. Thus, the transfer of data from remote 
site to other sites is infeasible. Secondly, a secure data communication protocol must be The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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established between sites to transfer of keys, thus, incurring overheads for using secure 
communication protocol.  
 
Hybrid key management is the combination of both centralized and distributed system. The 
centralized key manager has a communication channel with all the remote key manager. Key 
generation is still performed at the centralized key manager but key recovery is performed on 
remote sites.  
 
3.1. Keys in Storage Area Network 
 
There are various levels of keys in SAN. In this section, we discuss some of them.  
Key per LUN: This is the most effective encryption scheme for storage as it could be managed 
at a LUN level.  
  CryptoStor KeyVault is a key generator manufactured by NeoScale 
  Key per slice on a LUN: If the LUN sizes become large, a key per slice should be used. It 
has to be done on a block level.  
  Keys per disks: Some benefits of a key per disk are effectively reissue the new key in case 
of disk failure or lose the key.  
  Keys per arrays: This is only required one or two keys to encrypt the data. The second key 
could be used as a key to protect the first key within the array. 
  Keys per RAID: RAID groups could be used a common key for each group.  
  Keys per Data: At data level, the keys could be allocated to data. Figure 3.  
  Keys per User: At data level, the keys could be allocated to data. Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Key per slice on a LUN 
 
3.2. Key Management Lifecycle for Storage Area Network 
 
  Key Generation: Key Generation is the process of generating keys for encryption and 
decryption. Random number generators (RGNs) are required for key generation. There are 
deterministic Random bit Generators (DRBGs) or pseudo RGNs and Non-Deterministic 
random number generators or true RNGs.  
  Key Distribution: There is a need to distribute the key in a secure manner to the authorized 
entities. The suitable options are manual distribution (e.g smartcards) and auto distribution 
(e.g electronic key distribution). 
  Key Archiving: The best practice is to archive the key when a key is distributed. It needs to 
provide both integrity and access control.  
  Key Sharing:  
  Key Recovering: 
  Rekeying: The Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati  
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  Key Deletion:  
 
 
 
4. Possible Research Directions 
 
We have identified two possible areas of research direction that can be further explored. As 
mentioned earlier in previous sections, re-key is a process of decrypt the entire Logical Unit 
Number (LUN) then encrypt with a new key. This result in performance degradation thus, 
affecting the overall performance of the system. Usually, the appliance must be left running on 
the background. Although most regulatory compliance does not require re-keying operation, 
however, it is recommended as a best practice for data at rest to re-key at least once every 6-12 
months. We could explore the slicing-of-LUN operation on partial of the LUN size. Encryption 
keys are transparent inside the encryption appliance thus, the keys are stored in the main 
memory while performing encryption and decryption of data. Usually these keys are stored on 
the flash or hard disk drive, this could weaken the security when a potential insider attacks into 
the flash or disk by accessing the management console of the appliance. A recent article [7] 
explores the technique to hack keys of the main memory.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have introduced and studied the area of storage security emphasizing on encryption and 
key management. Although a considerable amount of research has dedicated to encryption 
algorithms, key management is still an issue. We have outlined the importance of key 
management system in storage. Moreover, we have identified the possible research direction in 
key management system.  
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